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Jacqueline Cuozzo 
Law and Sexuality – Final Paper 
 
GOING HOME WITH MY(TRUE)SELF AT THE END OF THE NIGHT: HOW JESPERSEN V. 
HARRAH’S TURNED HARD FACTS INTO GOOD LAW BY RESPECTING THE LIMITS OF 
TITLE VII AND THE TRUTH THAT APPEARANCES MATTER 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
“Appearance rules the world.”1  
 Little argument can be made that appearances do not matter, particularly in a society as 
media-driven and consumer-oriented as ours.  We judge people based on their appearance, and 
this reality is relevant to the ways in which businesses operate.  What is less clear, however, is 
the extent to which employers may regulate the appearance of their employees, particularly when 
such regulation consists of gender-differentiated appearance codes.  While the Supreme Court 
has yet to hear a case challenging sex-discriminatory appearance codes, lower courts have 
attempted to walk a fine line between satisfying the mandates of Title VII
2
 and maintaining some 
level of employer discretion in regulating employee appearance.     
 The Ninth Circuit has been particularly involved in the development of Title VII law as 
applied to dress and grooming requirements.  In 2006, the court’s en banc decision3 rejecting a 
Harrah’s Casino employee’s claim that the company’s mandatory makeup requirement for 
women constituted sex discrimination proved especially controversial.  Darlene Jespersen had 
been a bartender at Harrah’s in Reno for twenty years, during which time she compiled an 
exemplary record.
4
  But when the company decided to enforce a mandatory “Personal Best” 
                                                 
1
 FRIEDRICH SCHILLER 
2
 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000e-2(a)(1)-(2) (2010), provides: “It shall be unlawful 
employment practice for an employer . . . to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to 
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin . . . .” (emphasis added).   
3
 Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc).   
4
 Id. at 1107.   
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policy
5
 whereby male and female beverage service employees were required to comply with 
certain appearance standards, Jespersen’s employment with Harrah’s came to a screeching halt.  
Of the extensive guidelines set forth by Harrah’s, there was one that Jespersen absolutely refused 
to follow: the requirement that all female bartenders where face powder, blush, mascara, and lip 
color while at work.
6
  Jespersen did not wear makeup off the job and did not feel comfortable 
wearing it on the job, either, as she claimed it “conflict[ed] with her self-image” and “interfered 
with her ability to perform as a bartender.”7  Having been released from her employment with 
Harrah’s due to her unwillingness to comply with the “Personal Best” policy, Jespersen brought 
a Title VII action against Harrah’s which has generated a slew of controversy and criticism 
among academics both inside and outside of the legal community. 
                                                 
5
 The “Personal Best” policy provided, in relevant part:  
All Beverage Service Personnel, in addition to being friendly, polite, courteous and responsive to 
our customer's needs, must possess the ability to physically perform the essential factors of the job 
as set forth in the standard job descriptions.  They must be well groomed, appealing to the eye, be 
firm and body toned, and be comfortable with maintaining this look while wearing the specified 
uniform.  Additional factors to be considered include, but are not limited to, hair styles, overall 
body contour, and degree of comfort the employee projects while wearing the uniform. 
 
Beverage Bartenders and Barbacks will adhere to these additional guidelines: 
 
Overall Guidelines (applied equally to male/ female):  
Appearance: Must maintain Personal Best image portrayed at time of hire. 
Jewelry, if issued, must be worn.  Otherwise, tasteful and simple jewelry is permitted; no large 
chokers, chains or bracelets.  No faddish hairstyles or unnatural colors are permitted.  
 
Males: 
Hair must not extend below top of shirt collar..  Ponytails are prohibited.  Hands and fingernails 
must be clean and nails neatly trimmed at all times.  No colored polish is permitted.  Eye and 
facial makeup is not permitted.  Shoes will be solid black leather or leather type with rubber (non 
skid) soles.  
 
Females:  Hair must be teased, curled, or styled every day you work. Hair must be worn down at 
all times, no exceptions.  Stockings are to be of nude or natural color consistent with employee's 
skin tone.  No runs.  Nail polish can be clear, white, pink or red color only. No exotic nail art or 
length.  Shoes will be solid black leather or leather type with rubber (non skid) soles.  Make up 
(face powder, blush and mascara) must be worn and applied neatly in complimentary [sic] colors. 
Lip color must be worn at all times.   
Id. at 1107 (emphasis in original).   
6
 Id. at 1107-08.   
7
 Id.  
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 Many critics have argued that the Ninth Circuit struck the wrong balance, paying an 
unreasonable amount of deference to employer preferences that perpetuate the objectification 
and subordination of women in the workplace.
8
  The soundness of this position rests on the 
premise that makeup has historically served to reinforce the stereotype that women are inferior 
beings whose primary value lies in their appearance.  In this paper, I argue that the use of 
makeup in our society is not intrinsically linked to a history of female subordination, but rather 
reflects a social norm whose establishment, however deeply entrenched, does not implicate the 
concerns of Title VII.  Moreover, given that Darlene Jespersen’s case did not fit within the sex 
discrimination theories upon which she relied, a decision rendering Harrah’s makeup 
requirement unlawful would have carved out a new area of protection that is relevant to Title VII 
concerns in only the most circuitous of ways: protection against discrimination based on 
appearance.  By objecting to employer appearance codes on the basis that these codes conflict 
with one’s autonomy or self-image, employees would have virtually unbridled discretion to look 
and dress however they pleased.  Thus, had the Ninth Circuit provided such protection to 
Darlene Jespersen, it would have created a slippery slope whereby the lawfulness of any 
appearance requirement imposed on employees would become questionable.   
 This paper begins with an overview of Title VII sex discrimination jurisprudence.  Dress 
and grooming code decisions analyzed under an undue burdens framework are discussed first, 
followed by a summary of the Supreme Court’s watershed decision in Price Waterhouse v. 
Hopkins
9
 and the sex stereotyping cases that have emerged therefrom.  The Ninth Circuit’s 
                                                 
8
 See, e.g., Diane Avery & Marion Crain, Branded: Corporate Image, Sexual Stereotyping, and the New Face of 
Capitalism, 14 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 13 (2007); Hilary J. Bouchard, Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co.: 
Employer Appearance Standards and the Promotion of Gender Stereotypes, 58 ME. L. REV. 203 (2006); Alison J. 
Hartwell, Makeup For Success: Why Jespersen v. Harrah’s Stifles Diversity By Promoting Stereotypes in 
Employment, 13 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 407 (2007); Allison T. Steinle, Appearance and Grooming Standards as 
Sex Discrimination in the Workplace, 56 CATH. U.L. REV. 261 (2006).    
9
 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
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analysis in Jespersen v. Harrah’s is then discussed against the backdrop of these cases.  This 
overview is followed by an evaluation of the Jespersen Court’s holding, as well as a discussion 
of the criticisms that have urged courts to provide greater protections for employees subject to 
dress and grooming standards, particularly when such standards are differentiated on the basis of 
sex.  This paper concludes with the proposition that Darlene Jespersen’s case did not 
demonstrate a clear case of sex discrimination, but rather is more appropriately viewed as an 
attack on employer regulation of employee appearance in general, the goal of which is 
problematic from both a legal and an ideological standpoint.      
II. TITLE VII SEX DISCRIMINATION JURISPRUDENCE: THE UNEQUAL 
BURDENS TEST, PRICE WATERHOUSE SEX STEREOTYPING, AND THE 
JESPERSEN V. HARRAH’S DECISION 
  
 In Jespersen v. Harrah’s, Darlene Jespersen relied on two theories of sex discrimination 
in arguing that Harrah’s makeup requirement violated Title VII, alleging that the “Personal Best” 
policy discriminated against women by “(1) subjecting them to terms and conditions of 
employment to which men are not similarly subjected, and (2) requiring that women conform to 
sex-based stereotypes as a term and condition of employment.”10  While Jespersen’s first 
“unequal burdens” 11 claim was rooted in an already well-settled theory of employment 
discrimination, her second claim, based on the emerging “sex stereotyping” theory,12 required a 
much more complex analysis due to the lower courts’ inconsistent application of the theory since 
its inception in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.     
 
 
                                                 
10
 Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1108. 
11
 Id.  
12
 Id. at 1111. 
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A. THE UNEQUAL BURDENS THEORY OF TITLE VII SEX DISCRIMINATION 
 On its face, the text of Title VII provides that it is unlawful for an employer to 
discriminate against an individual with respect to the terms or conditions of employment because 
of that individual’s sex.13  As one commentator has noted, “[t]his is a sweeping command, with 
great potential to eliminate employers’ economic leverage as a factor perpetuating many types of 
discrimination.”14  And while Title VII provides an exception to this antidiscrimination rule, 
allowing employers to hire and employ employees on the basis of sex “in those certain instances 
where . . . sex . . . is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonable necessary to the normal 
operation of that particulate business or enterprise,”15 this exception (hereinafter the “BFOQ 
exception”) has generally been read narrowly by the courts.16   
 For example, in Diaz v. Pan American World Airways,
17
 the Fifth Circuit held that sex 
was not a BFOQ for the job of a flight attendant, despite the asserted superiority of women in 
being sexually attractive to male passengers and comforting female passengers, because these 
characteristics were peripheral to the airline’s essential concern with safety and transportation.18  
In interpreting the word “necessary” as it appears in the text of Title VII’s BFOQ exception, the 
court stated that the test is one of “business necessity,” not “business convenience.”19  The court 
                                                 
13
 See 42 U.S.C.S. 2000e-2(a)(1)-(2) (2010).   
14
 David B. Cruz, Making Up Women: Casinos, Cosmetics, and Title VII, 5 NEV. L.J. 240, 243 (2004). 
15
 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (2010) (providing an exception for employment decisions on the basis of religion and 
national origin, as well as sex). 
16
 See, e.g., Int’l Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187, 201 (1991).  The Supreme Court described the 
limited applicability of the BFOQ exception as follows: 
The wording of the BFOQ defense contains several terms of restriction that indicate that the 
exception reaches only special situations in which discrimination is permissible to “certain 
instances” where sex discrimination is “reasonably necessary” to the “normal operation” of the 
“particular” business.  Each one of these terms – certain, normal, particular – prevents the use of 
general subjective standards and favors an objective, verifiable requirement.  But the most telling 
term is “occupational”; this indicates that these objective, verifiable requirements must concern 
job-related skills and aptitudes.     
17
 Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971). 
18
 Id. at 388.   
19
 Id.(emphases in original). 
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explained further that “discrimination based on sex is valid only when the essence of the 
business operation would be undermined by not hiring members of one test exclusively,” and 
went on to hold that “because the non-mechanical aspects of the job of flight cabin attendant are 
not ‘reasonably necessary to the normal operation’ of Pan Am's business, Pan Am cannot 
exclude all males simply because most males may not perform adequately,” regardless of 
customer preference for female flight attendants.
20
   
 Despite the far-reaching language of Title VII’s antidiscrimination mandate and the 
limited circumstances under which the BFOQ exception applies, sex-differentiated dress and 
grooming codes have largely evaded the proscriptions of Title VII because courts have been 
reluctant to find that such requirements discriminate against employees “because of” sex as 
envisioned by Title VII.
21
  However, where courts have found that a policy created an “unequal 
burden” for one gender, such policies have been struck down as violative of Title VII’s ban on 
sex discrimination.  For example, in Carroll v. Talman Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Chi.,22 the 
Seventh Circuit addressed a policy which required female employees at a savings and loans 
association to wear uniforms, while male employees were merely required to maintain business 
attire.  The rationale advanced by the employer for its separate dress codes was that it feared 
women could not be trusted to choose appropriate work attire, and was specifically concerned 
                                                 
20
 Id. at 388-89 (emphases in original). 
21
 See, e.g., Harper v. Blockbuster Entm’t Corp., 139 F.3d 1385, 1387 (11th Cir. 1998) (dismissing a challenge to a 
policy that prohibited men, but not women, from having long hair); Tavora v. N.Y. Mercantil Exch., 101 F.3d 907, 
908 (2d Cir. 1996) (upholding an employer policy that required male employees to have short hair but did not 
require the same for female employees); Wislocki-Goin v. Mears, 831 F.2d 1374, 1380 (7th Cir. 1987) (dismissing a 
Title VII claim alleging that a grooming policy imposed unduly harsh requirements on women); Fountain v. 
Safeway Stores, 555 F.2d 753, 755-56 (9th Cir. 1977) (permitting a requirement that male, but not female, 
employees wear ties); Dodge v. Giant Food, Inc., 488 F.2d 1333, 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (upholding a restriction 
prohibiting long hair on male employees but allowing long hair on female employees as not discriminating on the 
basis of sex); Austin v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 20 F.Supp. 2d 1254, 1257 (finding a grooming policy requiring male 
employees to maintain hair length above the collar acceptable under Title VII); Rogers v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 527 F. 
Supp. 229, 231(S.D.N.Y. 1981) (upholding a policy “that prohibits to both sexes a style more often adopted by 
members of one sex” under a Title VII challenge).   
22Carroll v. Talman Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Chi., 604 F.2d 1028 (7th Cir. 1979) 
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that women would wear skirts that the employer considered inappropriately revealing.
23
  In 
holding that the employer’s differential policy was “based on offensive stereotypes prohibited by 
Title VII,” the court discussed how such disparate treatment was demeaning to female 
employees, reasoning that “[w]hile there is nothing offensive about uniforms Per se, when some 
employees are uniformed and others not there is a natural tendency to assume that the uniformed 
women have a lesser professional status than their male colleagues attired in normal business 
clothes.”24   
 In the Ninth Circuit, the unequal burdens test has been developed in the context of several 
airline cases addressing sex-differentiated weight restrictions for male and female employees.  In 
Gerdom v. Continental Airlines, Inc.,
25
 the court considered Continental’s imposition of strict 
weight regulations for its female flight attendants, in the absence of any corresponding weight 
restriction for male employees who performed the same or similar job functions.  Touted by the 
airline as a policy intended to “create the public image of an airline which offered passengers 
service by thin, attractive women,” the court found that it imposed a “significantly greater burden 
of compliance” on women, thereby resulting in sex discrimination.26  In the more recent case of 
Franks v. United Airlines, Inc.,
27
 the Ninth Circuit similarly invalidated a weight policy that 
imposed different standards for men and women in a way that applied less favorably to one 
gender.  While United’s weight maximums for female flight attendants corresponded to a 
medium body frame standard, the maximums for male flight attendants generally corresponded 
to a large body frame standard.
28
  Recognizing that “an appearance standard that imposes 
                                                 
23
 Id. at 1033.   
24
 Id.  
25
 Gerdom v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 692 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1982). 
26
 Id. at 604, 606 
27
 Franks v. United Airlines, Inc., 216 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. 2001). 
28
 Id. at 854.   
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different but essentially equal burdens on men and women is not disparate treatment,” the court 
nevertheless found that United’s policy imposed greater burdens upon female employees, as 
evidenced by the policy itself.
29
   
 Despite the Ninth Circuit’s familiarity with the unequal burdens test in the context of 
physical requirements such as weight restrictions, unequal burdens imposed by a sex-
differentiated appearance code might also arise in the form of disparate costs or time required to 
comply with a policy.
30
  Indeed, Darlene Jespersen relied upon both of these arguments in her 
case against Harrah’s, though these arguments ultimately proved unsuccessful.31   
B. PRICE WATERHOUSE V. HOPKINS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF SEX 
STEREOTYPING THEORY  
 
 First articulated by the Supreme Court in the 1989 case Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,
 32 
sex-stereotyping theory is a relatively recent and largely unresolved area of Title VII 
jurisprudence.  In Price Waterhouse, Ann Hopkins was a senior manager at a nationwide 
accounting firm who had been selected for potential partnership.
33
  Although the firm’s partners 
and Hopkin’s clients agreed that she was “extremely competent, intelligent,” “energetic and 
creative” and an “outstanding professional,”34 her partnership was ultimately denied.  Many of 
the partners who objected to Hopkin’s candidacy did so on account of her aggressive, “macho” 
personality,
35
 and she was told that her chances for partnership would improve if she would 
“walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her 
                                                 
29
 Id.  
30
 See Michael Selmi, The Many Faces of Darlene Jespersen, 14 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 467, 470-71 (2007). 
31
 See infra Part II.C.2. 
32
 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
33
Id. at  231. 
34
 Id. at 234.   
35
 Id. at 235. 
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hair styled, and wear jewelry.”36  Hopkins subsequently brought a Title VII claim against Price 
Waterhouse, alleging that the firm discriminated against her on the basis of sex as to decisions 
regarding the partnership.
37
        
 While Price Waterhouse is often recognized as having established the “Mixed Motive” 
defense in Title VII cases,
38
 its expansion of the scope of Title VII to “sex stereotyping” has also 
been influential in providing an alternative legal theory for Title VII plaintiffs.
39
  In finding that 
sex stereotypes played an impermissible role in Hopkin’s performance evaluations, Justice 
Brennan clarified the term “sex stereotyping” as it applies to Title VII: 
[W]e are beyond the day when an employer could evaluate employees by 
assuming or insisting that they matched the stereotype associated with their group, 
for “[i]n forbidding employers to discriminate against individuals because of their 
sex, Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of 
men and women resulting from sex stereotypes” . . . . An employer who objects to 
aggressiveness in women but whose positions require this trait places women in 
an intolerable and impermissible catch 22: out of a job if they behave aggressively 
and out of a job if they did not.  Title VII lifts women out of this bind . . . . The 
plaintiff must show that the employer actually relied on her gender in making its 
decisions.  In making this showing, stereotyped remarks can certainly be evidence 
that gender played a part.
40
   
 
But while the Court in Price Waterhouse clearly announced that evidence of sex stereotyping is 
relevant to the sex discrimination inquiry, it has been a difficult case for lower courts to apply 
due to the Court’s unwillingness to clarify the standard of proof required to establish that sex 
                                                 
36
 Id. (quoting findings made by the District Court for the District of Columbia in the decision below, 618 F. Supp. 
1109, 1117 (D.D.C. 1985)). 
37
 Id. at 231.   
38
 In the context of sex discrimination law, “mixed motive” refers to the principle that once a plaintiff has 
established that gender played “a motivating part in an employment decision, the defendant may avoid a finding of 
liability only by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have made the same decision even if it 
had not taken the plaintiff’s gender into account.”  Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 258.  
39
 See Steinle, supra note 8, at 275.   
40
 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251 (quoting Los Angeles Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 
n.13 (1978)).   
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stereotyping played a part in an employment decision.
41
  Therefore, it is unsurprising that the 
Jespersen Court so easily distinguished Price Waterhouse in rejecting Jespersen’s sex 
stereotyping claim.
42
     
 The Price Waterhouse sex stereotyping theory has been met with the greatest success in 
the context of same-sex harassment claims.
43
  It was the Supreme Court’s decision in Oncale v. 
Sundower Offshore Services, Inc.,
44
 in combination with the groundwork laid by Price 
Waterhouse, that sparked an interest in the development of this theory.
45
  In Oncale, the plaintiff 
worked on an eight-man oil platform crew and alleged that he was harassed by his co-workers 
because he was effeminate and thus “failed to meet the image of what a man should be like.”46  
Although the thrust of the Court’s holding was its announcement that sex discrimination 
consisting of same-sex sexual harassment is cognizable under Title VII,
47
 Oncale also illustrated, 
however implicitly, that extreme reactions to what is perceived to be gender-inappropriate 
behavior can result in legal exposure under Title VII.
48
   
 In Nichols v. Azteca Restaurant Enterprises, the Ninth Circuit relied upon both Price 
Waterhouse and Oncale in holding that the plaintiff stated a viable claim based on sex 
stereotyping theory that he was “discriminated against for acting too feminine.” 49     The 
plaintiff, a waiter at Azteca Restaurant, alleged that he was subjected to persistent harassment by 
                                                 
41
 See id. at 252 (“[W]e do not suggest a limitation on the possible ways of proving that stereotyping played a 
motivating role in an employment decisions, and we refrain from deciding here which specific facts . . . would or 
would not establish a plaintiff’s case.”); see also Hartwell, supra note 8, at 424; Steinle, supra note 8, at 276 (noting 
that “[l]ower courts must rely on the specific facts of Price Waterhouse and the Court’s vague language in 
determining how far the Price Waterhouse decision extends, and in what contexts it applies.”). 
42
 See infra Part II.C.3. 
43
 See Selmi, supra note 30, at 473.   
44
 Oncale v. Sundower Offshore Servs.,523 U.S. 75 (1998). 
45
 Selmi, supra note 30, at 474. 
46
 Id. at 473.  
47
 See Oncale, 523 U.S. at 82. 
48
 See 10-261 Lab. & Employ. L., Dress, Grooming, and Appearance Guidelines, MB § 261.03 (2010).   
49
 Nichols v. Azteca Restaurant Enters., 256 F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001). 
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his co-workers because he “failed to conform to a male stereotype.”50  The court described this 
harassment in the following terms: 
 [T]he systematic abuse directed at Sanchez reflected a belief that Sanchez did not 
act as a man should act.  Sanchez was attacked for walking and carrying his tray 
“like a woman” - i.e., for having feminine mannerisms.  Sanchez was derided for 
not having sexual intercourse with a waitress who was his friend.  Sanchez's male 
co-workers and one of his supervisors repeatedly reminded Sanchez that he did 
not conform to their gender-based stereotypes, referring to him as “she” and 
“her.”  And, the most vulgar name-calling directed at Sanchez was cast in female 
terms.
51
  
 
Concluding that the abuse was closely linked to gender and therefore violated the Price 
Waterhouse rule barring discrimination on the basis of sex stereotypes,
52
 the Ninth Circuit drew 
upon much of the same reasoning underlying Oncale, but in such a way that gave explicit 
recognition to stereotyping theory.
53
 
 In other circuits that have decided sex stereotyping cases, these cases have generally dealt 
with plaintiffs whose claims have somehow implicated their sexual orientation and/or sexual 
practices.
54
  This has created a fundamental incoherence in that Title VII does not offer 
protection for discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, yet sexual orientation has served 
                                                 
50
 Id.  
51
 Id.  
52
 Id. 
53
 See Selmi, supra note 30, at 474-75.  For a similar case in which the Ninth Circuit held that sex stereotyping 
theory provided a grounds for relief under Title VII, regardless of the fact that the plaintiff stated he was harassed 
because he was gay rather than because of stereotyping, see Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d 1061 (9th 
Cir. 2002) (en banc).    
54
 See, e.g. Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 572 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that a transsexual fire fighter who 
expressed a more feminine appearance when undergoing treatment for Gender Identity Disorder and who was 
subsequently driven out of the department by his superiors stated a Title VII claim for his “failure to conform to sex 
stereotypes concerning how a man should look and behave”); Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729 (6th Cir. 
2005) (applying Salem to affirm a verdict of $575,00 based on a sex-stereotyping claim for a pre-operative 
transsexual police officer who was denied a promotion for not being masculine enough); but see Vickers v. Fairfield 
Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757 (6th Cir. 2006) (rejecting plaintiff’s sex stereotyping claim and finding that the harassment 
of which plaintiff complained was more properly viewed as harassment based on his perceived homosexuality, 
rather than based on gender non-conformity, and thus not protected by Title VII). 
12 
 
as a relevant factor in determining whether sex stereotyping occurred.
55
  In any event, because 
Darlene Jespersen’s claim focused on her appearance rather than her perceived sexual 
orientation, it is difficult to analogize her case to the recent trends in gender stereotyping 
jurisprudence.   
C. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION IN JESPERSEN V. HARRAH’S OPERATING CO. 
1.  Facts and Procedural History 
 Darlene Jespersen was by all accounts a spectacular bartender during her twenty year 
tenure at Harrah’s Casino,56 which began in 1979 and came to an unfortunate end in 2000.57   
Throughout Jespersen’s entire term of employment, the company maintained a policy 
encouraging female beverage servers to wear makeup on the job.
58
  It was not until 2000, 
however, that the policy became mandatory,
59
 thereby precipitating her termination by and 
subsequent lawsuit against Harrah’s.  The “Personal Best” program at issue in her case contained 
certain appearance standards that applied equally to both male and female employees, including 
a “standard uniform of black pants, white shirt, black vest, and black bow tie.”60  However, the 
policy also included several sex-differentiated requirements pertaining to hair, nails, and 
makeup.
61
  For example, male employees’ hair could not extend below the top of the shirt collar, 
and female employees’ hair had to be teased, curled, or styled every day.62  Of the 
comprehensive guidelines set forth by the “Personal Best” program, there was only one provision 
                                                 
55
 See Selmi, supra note 30, at 479 (observing that recent gender stereotyping cases have “restored the confusion 
Oncale was intended to eliminate” because “the courts are again evaluating the plaintiff’s sexual orientation, as well 
as the identities of the harassers, to determine whether a claim is cognizable,” and arguing that the extension of Title 
VII to discrimination based on sexual orientation would simplify the law). 
56
 See Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1118 (9th Cir. 2006) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (en banc) 
(describing Jespersen as a “valued, experienced employee who had gained accolades from her customers”).   
57
 See Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 280 F.Supp. 2d 1189, 1190 (D.Nev. 2002). 
58
 Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1107.   
59
 Id.   
60
 Id.  For a detailed version of the policy’s relevant appearance guidelines, see supra note 5. 
61
 Id.  
62
 Id. 
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to which Darlene Jespersen was adamantly opposed: the requirement that all female bartenders 
wear makeup.
63
   
 The provision specifically provided that for female bartenders, “[m]akeup (face powder, 
blush and mascara) must be worn and applied neatly and in complementary colors,” and “[l]ip 
color must be worn at all times.”64  Darlene Jespersen, a “nearly six-foot tall, broad-shouldered 
woman with a down to earth persona,”65 did not wear makeup off the job, and soon found that 
she could not wear it on the job without sacrificing her performance as a bartender.
66
  Jespersen 
found makeup both uncomfortable and incompatible with her self-image, and she therefore 
refused to comply with the company’s policy.67  Harrah’s subsequently released Jespersen from 
her employment, and she thereafter brought suit against the company on the grounds that the 
“Personal Best” program discriminated against women by subjecting them to unduly 
burdensome conditions of employment and requiring them to women conform to sex-based 
stereotypes.
68
 
 The district court granted Harrah’s motion for summary judgment on all of Jespersen’s 
claims,
69
 and a three-judge panel for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.
70
  The panel held that although 
grooming policies could violate Title VII as a matter of law, Jespersen nevertheless failed to 
show that the “Personal Best” program imposed a greater burden on women than on men.71  
Moreover, the panel interpreted Price Waterhouse as applying to appearance standards only in 
situations where the policy amounted to sexual harassment, which required a showing that the 
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65
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plaintiff suffered harassment for failure to conform to gender stereotypes.
72
  The Ninth Circuit 
thereafter took the case en banc, reaffirming the judgment of district court and panel majority on 
somewhat different grounds.
73
    
2.  The Unequal Burdens Claim: An Insufficient Record Proves Fatal  
 The first claim advanced by Jespersen was that by subjecting women to terms and 
conditions of employment to which men were not similarly subjected, Harrah’s “Personal Best” 
policy created an unequal burden on women which amounted to sex discrimination.
74
  The court 
rejected Jespersen’s argument that the makeup requirement itself was sufficient to establish a 
prima facie case of discriminatory intent that must be justified by Harrah’s as a BFOQ,75 stating 
that the settled law “does not support [the] position that a sex-based difference in appearance 
standards alone, without any further showing of disparate effects, creates a prima facie case.”76  
Citing Gerdom v. Continental and Frank v. United, the court conceded that some grooming and 
appearance policies may place a greater burden on one gender than another in violation of Title 
VII, but held that it could not find as such here without further evidence of the burdensome 
nature of Harrah’s makeup requirement.77  It described the policy in Gerdom, where the weight 
restriction was “part of an overall program to create a sexual image for the airline,” as clearly 
distinguishable from Harrah’s policy, which “applied to both male and female bartenders, and 
                                                 
72
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was aimed at creating a professional and very similar look for all of them.”78  Citing to a long list 
of cases which have recognized that employers may adopt grooming standards that appropriately 
differentiate between the genders, the Jespersen Court refused to accept that Harrah’s policy, on 
its face, amounted to anything more than “slight differences in appearance requirements for 
males and females” that “have only a negligible effect on employment opportunities.”79   
 Jespersen’s failure to create a record establishing that the “Personal Best” program was 
unduly burdensome for female employees thus foreclosed any chance of success under this 
theory.  Refusing to take judicial notice of the fact that “it costs more money and takes more time 
for a woman to comply with the makeup requirement than it takes for a man to comply with the 
requirement that he keep his hair short,” the court indicated that documentation or other evidence 
of the relative cost and time required by men and women to comply with Harrah’s policy was 
necessary for a prima facie showing of unequal burdens.
80
   
3.  The Sex Stereotyping Claim: Failing to Fit Within the Legal Framework 
 As the case law on stereotyping theory suggests,
81
 Darlene Jespersen’s second claim 
alleging that the “Personal Best” program discriminated against women by requiring them to 
conform to sex-based stereotypes
82
 was a far more difficult concept for the Jespersen Court to 
apply, as Jespersen’s case did not fit neatly within the existing legal framework.83  Ultimately, 
the court relied on factual distinctions between Price Waterhouse and subsequent Ninth Circuit 
cases interpreting sex stereotyping theory in the context of Title VII, as well as its independent 
judgment that the record failed to establish evidence of stereotypical motivation by Harrah’s, to 
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reject Jespersen’s claim that the makeup requirement constituted unlawful discrimination due to 
sex stereotyping.
84
        
 The court began by reciting the holding in Price Waterhouse that in order to establish that 
“‘gender played a motivating part in an employment decision,’ a plaintiff in a Title VII case may 
introduce evidence that the employment decision was made in part because of a sex 
stereotype.”85  Nevertheless, the court found Price Waterhouse distinguishable in that the 
stereotyping to which Ann Hopkins was subjected rightfully interfered with her ability to 
perform at work.
86
  Because the criticisms of Hopkins’ superiors, such as the recommendation 
that she “take ‘a course at charm school,’”87 were intended to discourage the aggressive behavior 
that allowed her to achieve professional success in the first place, impermissible sex stereotyping 
was clear since “the very traits that she was asked to hide were the same traits considered 
praiseworthy by men.”88  Harrah’s policy, on the other hand, did not single out Jespersen the way 
Hopkins had been singled out in Price Waterhouse, and “there was nothing to suggest the 
grooming standards would objectively inhibit a women’s ability to do the job.”89  Moreover, in 
viewing the makeup requirement in the context of the overall “Personal Best” program, the court 
stated there was “no evidence . . . to indicate that the policy was adopted to make women 
bartenders conform to a commonly-accepted stereotypical image of what women should wear.”90  
The court felt that the only evidence of stereotyping offered by Jespersen was her “own 
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subjective reaction to the makeup requirement,”91 which was clearly insufficient to support her 
claim. 
 Acknowledging its respect for Jespersen’s “resolve to be true to herself and to the image 
that she wishes to project to the world,” the Ninth Circuit went on to reason that if Jespersen’s 
personal objection to the makeup requirement alone were enough to support a sex stereotyping 
claim, the court would “come perilously close to holding that every grooming, apparel, or 
appearance requirement that an individual finds personally offensive, or in conflict with his or 
her self-image, can create a triable issue of sex discrimination.”92  The court conceded that had 
Harrah’s intended its policy to be sexually provocative or portray its female bartenders as sex 
objects, Jespersen would have had a viable claim.
93
  In actuality, however, Jespersen was 
required to wear a unisex uniform that covered her entire body
94
 – a far cry from what most 
would consider provocative or sexy.   
 Turning to cases from the Ninth Circuit that have addressed sex stereotyping claims after 
Price Waterhouse, the Jespersen Court then distinguished the case at bar from those where 
sexual harassment had occurred.  In Nichols v. Azteca Restaurant and Rene v. MGM Grand 
Hotel, the Ninth Circuit had applied Price Waterhouse’s holding that “sexual harassment of an 
employee because of that employee’s failure to conform to commonly-accepted gender 
stereotypes is sex discrimination in violation of Title VII.”95  Both cases dealt with claims that 
the plaintiff had endured harassment for failing to “‘act as a man should act’”96 or “conform to 
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commonly-accepted male stereotypes.”97  Despite the fact that Nichols and Rene did not involve 
dress or grooming codes, the court stated that those cases nevertheless “provide the framework 
for this court’s analysis of when sex stereotyping rises to the level of sex discrimination,” and 
found that Jespersen’s case was conceptually inconsistent because “Harrah’s actions [did] not 
condone[ ] or subject[ ] Jespersen to any form of alleged harassment.”98  Moreover, unlike the 
plaintiff in Price Waterhouse, the court found that Jespersen had not been treated any differently 
than the other Harrah’s bartenders (both male and female), and therefore considered her claim 
materially different than Ann Hopkins’ insofar as Harrah’s appearance guidelines “[did] not 
require Jespersen to conform to a stereotypical image that would objectively impede her ability to 
perform her job requirements as a bartender.”99  Although the court acknowledged that a 
cognizable claim of sex stereotyping on the basis of appearance codes is possible, it ultimately 
held that Jespersen failed to provide sufficient evidence that such a violation occurred here: 
This record . . . is devoid of any basis for permitting this particular claim to go 
forward, as it is limited to the subjective reaction of a single employee, and there 
is no evidence of a stereotypical motivation on the part of the employer.  This 
case is essentially a challenge to one small part of what is an overall apparel, 
appearance, and grooming policy that applies largely the same requirements to 
both men and women . . . . [I]n commenting on grooming standards, the 
touchstone is reasonableness.  A makeup requirement must be seen in the context 
of the overall standards imposed on employees in a given workplace.
100
   
 
4.  The Dissents: Expanding Price Waterhouse and Appreciating Women’s Makeup Woes 
 
 Of the eleven circuit judges who heard oral argument, four judges dissented in two 
separate opinions.  Judge Pregerson agreed with the majority that Jespersen failed to create a 
sufficient record in support of her unequal burdens claim.
101
   However, he challenged the 
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majority’s finding that Harrah’s policy was not motivated by sex stereotypes, and felt that 
“[q]uite simply, her termination for failing to comply with a grooming policy that imposed a 
facial uniform on only female bartenders [was] ‘because of sex’” and therefore incompatible 
with Title VII’s demand that “‘gender must be irrelevant to employment decisions.’”102  Looking 
to the language of Price Waterhouse, Judge Pregerson considered Jespersen’s failure to present 
additional evidence immaterial to her second claim, arguing that “little is required to make out a 
sex-stereotyping – as distinct from an undue burden – claim in this situation.”103  Because Price 
Waterhouse refused to delineate the type or quantity of evidence required for a prima facie 
showing of sex stereotyping, the judge deemed “the fact that Harrah’s designed and promoted a 
policy that required women to conform to a sex stereotype by wearing full makeup” sufficient 
evidence of discrimination.
104
 
 Criticizing the majority’s failure to consider the makeup requirement separately, Judge 
Pregerson worried that analyzing the policy through such a broad lens allowed the discriminatory 
nature of the makeup requirement to be disregarded when considered in light of other provisions 
of the policy that either had burdensome effects on the opposite gender or applied to both 
genders in a neutral way.
105
  The judge interpreted Harrah’s makeup requirement as demeaning 
to women in much the same way as the female-only uniform policy in Carroll v. Talman, 
attributing Harrah’s actions to the “cultural assumption – and gender-based stereotype – that 
women’s faces are incomplete, unattractive, or unprofessional without full makeup.”106 
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  Judge Kozinski similarly took issue with the majority’s treatment of Jespersen’s 
stereotyping claim, but also wrote a separate dissent to voice his disagreement with the finding 
that Jespersen did not present sufficient evidence that the makeup requirement created an 
unequal burden for women.
107
  The judge argued that judicial notice should have been taken of 
the substantial time and costs associated with the makeup requirement relative to the 
corresponding grooming requirements for men, reasoning that “[y]ou don’t need an expert 
witness to figure out that [makeup doesn’t] grow on trees . . . [n]or is there any rational doubt 
that the application of makeup is an intricate and painstaking process that requires considerable 
time and care.” 108 
 Notwithstanding his disagreement with the majority’s refusal to take judicial notice, 
Judge Kozinski also argued that Jespersen’s testimony that she found it burdensome to wear 
makeup because it conflicted with her self-image and interfered with her job performance 
constituted relevant evidence to the unequal burdens inquiry which should not have been 
dismissed.
109
  Emphasizing the “intensely personal choice” involved in wearing cosmetics, the 
judge described women’s makeup-wearing as a “cultural artifact” and implied that this cultural 
norm should give way to less antiquated notions of what a “real women” look like.110   
III. AN EVALUATION OF JESPERSEN V. HARRAH’S: RESPECTING THE LIMITS OF 
TITLE VII’S REACH 
 
A. THE UNEQUAL BURDENS CLAIM 
 Despite Judge Kosinski’s appeal for judicial notice that Harrah’s makeup requirement 
imposed certain onerous burdens on female employees, the majority’s finding that Jespersen 
failed to provide sufficient evidence that a significant burden of compliance attended the makeup 
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requirement, but not any corresponding grooming requirement for male employees, was 
consistent with the settled law addressing unequal burdens in the context of Title VII.  As 
touched upon by the court,
111
 had Jespersen been required to wear a particularly suggestive outfit 
or been similarly objectified in complying with Harrah’s policy, the court would likely have been 
receptive to her claim.
112
  But Jespersen did not claim that the policy’s unequal burden stemmed 
from Harrah’s attempts to “sex her up” in order to increase business,113 and the court was 
therefore justified in treating her case like those where the courts condoned sex-differentiated 
grooming policies absent tangible evidence that the policies imposed a greater burden of 
compliance on one gender.  Under this framework, and refusing to take judicial notice of the 
strains on time and cost associated with wearing makeup, Jespersen’s undeveloped record was 
fatal to her unequal burdens claim.      
 An argument may be made that the Ninth Circuit was overly pragmatic in its unequal 
burdens analysis, failing to consider the emotional and/or psychological detriments that women 
like Jespersen suffer as a result of mandatory makeup policies.
114
  But this line of reasoning fails 
to recognize that asking courts to engage in such a delicate inquiry may not only be difficult, but 
altogether unfeasible.  As one legal scholar was apt to point out, “we should be skeptical of 
courts’ ability . . . to discern uncomparable burdens, particularly because the burdens may 
actually be incommensurable.”115  Because Jespersen’s case hinged largely on her psychological 
reaction to Harrah’s policy, the undue burdens test was simply an inappropriate avenue for relief.  
The incongruity of this framework to the facts in Jespersen was actually conceded by an attorney 
                                                 
111
 See id. at 1112 (distinguishing EEOC v. Sage Realty Corp., 507 F.Supp. 599 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)).  
112
 See Selmi, supra note 30, at 471  
113
 See id (conceding that such a claim would have otherwise been consistent with the history of bartending and 
citing to Avery & Crain, supra note 8).   
114
 See Bouchard, supra note 8, at 217-18 (“[B]ecause the way that one chooses to present herself physically can be 
‘critical to [her] sense of dignity and self,’ judges should consider these described intangible effects of employer 
appearance codes before ‘weighing’ the burden it imposes on an employee.”) (footnote omitted). 
115
 See Cruz, supra note 14, at 247. 
22 
 
who had represented Jespersen in her appeal to the Ninth Circuit’s panel, as this attorney 
explained how “the more we considered the ‘equal burdens’ test, the more the exercise of 
comparing very different ‘burdens’ seemed illogical and incoherent.”116   
  Moreover, as asserted by Michael Selmi in his analysis of Jespersen v. Harrah’s, whether 
the court was right as to the unequal burdens claim is probably insignificant in the grand scheme 
of Jespersen’s case. 117   Selmi explains this position as follows: 
If she had prevailed on the unequal burdens argument, the policy may very well 
have stayed in place, with the company perhaps supplying the makeup to reduce 
the cost burden on women.  The company might also have reacted by increasing 
the burdens on the male employees, perhaps by requiring them to shave daily, put 
gel in their hair, or something along those lines.  Similarly, prevailing on the 
undue burdens tests would not have advanced the law; rather, this would have 
been an application of a limited but well-established legal principle.
118
   
  
Therefore, while the Ninth Circuit’s unequal burdens analysis in Jespersen is somewhat 
unsatisfying in its overly-formalistic approach, the court was constrained by the doctrinal 
limitations of the legal theory advanced, and the unequal burdens claim nevertheless proved to 
be a less important aspect of the case in the overall context of evolving Title VII jurisprudence. 
B. THE SEX STEREOTYPING CLAIM 
 The far more complicated issue in Jespersen was whether Harrah’s makeup policy 
constituted sex discrimination on the basis of sex stereotyping as envisioned by Title VII and set 
forth in Price Waterhouse.  The facts in Jespersen did not fit neatly within the existing line of 
cases interpreting the Supreme Court’s expanded view of Title VII protection, which has 
generally applied stereotyping theory to harassment or other adverse employment actions 
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directed at an individual on the basis of his or her perceived gender nonconformity.
119
  The Ninth 
Circuit was reasonable to point out the conceptual difficulties in attempting to apply the Price 
Waterhouse theory to the unfamiliar context of appearance codes, and was warranted in 
distinguishing Jespersen on that basis.   
 However, the additional justification for its holding, that “[t]here is no evidence . . . to 
indicate that the policy was adopted to make women bartenders conform to a commonly-
accepted stereotypical image of what women should wear,”120 is at first hard to swallow.  Many 
critics have argued that the Jespersen decision perpetuates and reinforces harmful stereotypes of 
women as merely “ornamental, objects of beauty to be contemplated, not agents with talents to 
be esteemed.”121  Although this position is not without reason, it nevertheless overstates the 
symbolic significance of makeup in our society and understates its practical significance in 
attractiveness judgments.  In the absence of convincing evidence that makeup serves a more 
significant social function than as a marker of attractiveness, but rather continues to operate as an 
emblem of women’s inferiority, the courts should not be expected to eradicate appearance codes 
in the workplace merely because they embrace socially constructed, gender-differentiated 
appearance norms.   
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 Feminist scholars have made much of the damaging impact of beauty practices on 
women, and legal scholars have relied on these critiques in analyzing Jespersen.
122
  For example, 
feminist scholar Sheila Jeffries posits that “[b]eauty practices show that women are obedient, 
willing to do their service, and to put effort into that service.  They show . . . that women are not 
simply ‘different,’ but, most importantly, ‘deferential.’”123  Yet despite this radical stance, 
Jeffries concedes that “[t]here is little research on the reasons why women wear makeup or 
engage in other forms of ‘grooming,’ the effects that these practices have on women’s feelings 
about themselves and others, and their interactions with the public world.”124  It is therefore 
difficult to conceive why a court should be responsible for prohibiting appearance standards such 
as makeup requirements on the basis that they perpetuate stereotypes of women as inferior, when 
there is inadequate research linking makeup use with female oppression.  
 In fact, historian Kathy Peiss’ research on the economic enterprise of beauty and its 
interactions with and influences on cultural and social developments in modern America reveals 
a far different story.
125
  In discussing the evolution of the beauty business as we know it today, 
Peiss highlights the important role played by women in small-scale beauty enterprises during the 
nineteenth century and onward.
126
  According to Peiss, it was the “seamstresses, hairdressers, 
beauticians, department store buyers, and cosmetics saleswomen” that “made beauty and fashion 
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integral to the lives of women,” and these beauty businesses “opened opportunities for . . . 
women by aligning commercial enterprise with the very ideals of femininity and beauty that had 
long justified women’s exclusion from most lines of work.”127  These female-operated 
businesses shifted the beauty ideal away from one that “celebrated inner, moral beauty,” and 
toward a “new emphasis on external appearance and its cultivation through the purchase and use 
of cosmetics and other beauty aids.”128  This account is clearly inconsistent with the feminist 
critique of “[t]he beauty practices that women engage in” as “those of political subordinates.”129  
And while there may be some truth to the claim that the cosmetics industry has served to exploit 
women’s appearance anxieties that stem from our society’s tendency to evaluate a woman’s 
worth based on beauty,
130
 this position fails to appreciate the complex history of women and 
makeup use.  Kathy Peiss’ extensive exploration of America’s beauty culture reveals a much 
richer portrayal: 
Women have used makeup to declare themselves – to announce their adult status, 
sexual allure, youthful spirit, political beliefs – and even to proclaim their right to 
self-definition.  As in the past, cosmetics offer aesthetic, sensory, and 
psychological pleasures to those pressed by the obligations of home and work.  
And women still perceive beautifying as a domain of sociability, creativity, and 
play.
131
         
           
 Thus, despite the broad proposition of one eminent legal scholar that “few female-
associated dress or appearance conventions exist that are not linked with stereotypes about 
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women that emerged from or have become interwoven with their historically inferior status,”132 
it is not at all clear that makeup is one of these appearance conventions.  This scholar calls for an 
aggressive approach from the courts in challenging employment practices grounded in 
community norms, and proposes that courts attempt to “identify the cultural meanings 
underlying them and determin[e] to what extent they impose burdens that disadvantage a 
member of one sex in relation to the other.”133  Yet even under this approach, the cultural 
meanings and attendant burdens associated with makeup use are not so clearly debasing or unfair 
that the equality concerns of Title VII are plainly implicated in Jespersen.   
 Although the suggestion that makeup use is a marker of long-standing female 
subordination has been overstated by many critics of Jespersen,
134
 this is not to say that such 
beauty practices fail to reflect any important social conventions whatsoever.  Indeed, social 
science research has consistently found that both men and women who judge photographs of 
women with and without makeup deem those wearing makeup more physically attractive than 
those without.
135
  These findings seem to suggest that the makeup policy at issue in Jespersen 
should be interpreted not as reinforcing a sex stereotype, but rather as reflecting a societal reality: 
in our culture, women generally are more attractive when wearing makeup   
 The difference between stereotypes and social truths, albeit nuanced, is nonetheless 
significant when considering whether Harrah’s makeup policy implicated Title VII concerns.  A 
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stereotype is a rigid and simplistic belief about the characteristics of members of some specified 
social group.
136
  Yet an individual’s belief that women are more attractive when wearing makeup 
is not the type of attitude that constitutes stereotypical thinking – it simply demonstrates that 
individual’s perception of physical attractiveness, and therefore his or her subjective reality.  
That personal perceptions of beauty are influenced to at least some extent by culturally specific 
standards
137
 does not make them any less true, nor does it necessarily render such perceptions the 
product of overly simplistic attitudes which contribute to the type of sex stereotyping protected 
under Title VII.  Therefore, unless Title VII is to be expanded to provide protection against the 
regulation of employee appearances in general, the fact that businesses recognize that women are 
generally considered more attractive when wearing makeup is irrelevant for Title VII purposes.   
 This of course begs the question whether employers’ regulation of employees’ 
appearance, and particularly regulation that differentiates on the basis of gender, should be 
prohibited if it conflicts with an employee’s autonomy and/or self-identification.  Such drastic 
protection for employees and severe interference into the business judgments of employers not 
only runs counter to well-established principles of employment law,
138
  but it also sends the false 
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message that appearances do not matter.  Unlike equality of race, sex, religion, and national 
origin, equality based on appearance has never been a goal of our society,
139
 and it is not the job 
of the courts to dictate which traits are and are not socially salient and meaningful.
140
     
IV. AN ARGUMENT AGAINST COMPREHENSIVE REGULATION OF APPEARANCE 
CODES IN THE WORKPLACE 
 
 Given that Darlene Jespersen’s opposition to Harrah’s makeup requirement could not be 
validated on the basis of Title VII sex stereotyping, the lingering question underlying the 
Jespersen decision is whether courts should prohibit workplace dress and grooming codes 
merely because they embrace socially constructed, gender-differentiated appearance norms.  I 
maintain that unless we wish to live in a faceless society whereby natural human interaction is 
artificially suppressed
141
 or wish to harm American businesses in order to pursue the 
questionable goal of transforming the workplace into “a place for expressive activities or a place 
to pursue our authentic identity,”142 the answer to this question must be no. 
 The controversy concerning whether and to what extent employers should be able to 
enforce mandatory appearance requirements centers around two competing interests: the interest 
of employers in creating a corporate image that is tailored to consumer preferences, and the 
interest of employees in “being saved the identity, time, and economic costs involved in adhering 
to” 143 such policies.  One approach that would allow employers to regulate employee 
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appearances to some degree yet prevent employers from fashioning policies that adopt 
community-based appearance norms and consequently burden individuals who do not conform 
to such norms would be to allow only trait-neutral dress and grooming codes.  But as one legal 
scholar has pointed out, employers would likely respond to this constraint by “narrow[ing] the 
range of trait options available to their employees to only those that the employer [finds] 
acceptable when possessed by either sex,” thus forcing employees to “converge toward an 
androgynous mean.”144  Not only is such androgyny likely to burden individuals of one sex more 
than  the other since there is really no single hair or clothing style that “looks equally good and is 
equally socially acceptable on women and men,”145 it also fails to represent an ideal to which our 
society should aspire.   
 As noted by Robert Post in discussing the problems associated with “anti-lookism” 
philosophy,
146
 “social relationships characteristically transpire through the medium of 
appearances.”147  In only allowing for sex-neutral dress and grooming requirements, the law 
would put forth the dishonest message that an individual’s face, voice, body and gestures do not 
constitute critical aspects of that individual’s personhood.  Equating nondiscrimination with such 
strict neutrality not only shrouds society behind a “veil of ignorance” that “strip[s] away all 
‘accidents of natural endowment and  . . . contingencies of social circumstance,’”148 but also     
“diminish[es] the freedom of everyone while increasing that of no one.”149  Such an outcome 
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would clearly be undesirable for all those affected by this type of stringent appearance code 
regulation. 
 A converse approach to the workplace appearance issue would be to ban mandatory dress 
and grooming requirements altogether so as to allow employees to express their true “social 
identities”150 while at work.  Although such broad protection for appearance cannot be justified 
on Title VII grounds
151
 nor under any other established area of the law,
152
 many have argued that 
the current state of the law is inadequate and should be expanded so as to provide appearance 
protection in the employment realm.
153
  I argue that this view, although not without merit, 
nevertheless minimizes the negative impact that such unbridled discretion may have on 
employers while overstating the value of freedom of dress at work.  
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 Of the scholars who propose large-scale reform in the area of appearance protection, most 
do not place much emphasis on the plight of the employer,
154
 or simply refuse to accept that such 
reform would have a significant effect on the bottom line of many businesses.
155
  Yet as 
previously discussed, the presentation of appearances in everyday life is a vital component of 
human interaction, and it would be misguided to emphasize the importance of appearance in 
identity formation but fail to acknowledge that perhaps above all else, appearance is the medium 
through which we judge one another.  As such, employee appearances will undoubtedly affect 
customer satisfaction rates in service-based industries such as bartending, and the use of dress 
codes is therefore a significant marketing strategy that is vital to the success of many 
businesses.
156
                                
 At the same time, these scholars who give short thrift to the importance of employee 
appearances on customer satisfaction levels also view the workplace as an environment in which 
an employee’s identity should be created and expressed, particularly through the mode of 
dress.
157
  For example, Karl E. Klare’s argument that the law should eliminate mandatory 
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appearance policies and instead foster personal autonomy suggests that one goal of this type of 
reform is to increase the “eroticization” of the workplace.158  He describes this goal as follows: 
Work becomes understood as an arena of personal gratification and self-discovery 
and particularly a locus for encountering, communicating with, and in some cases 
forming personal relationships with other people.  In this view it would be 
appropriate that the rules of workplace dress and appearance be relaxed to permit 
greater on-the-job experimentation, imagination, play, enjoyment and expression 
of sexual autonomy.
159
    
 
However ambitious, this proposition depicts an unrealistic image of the workplace as a place 
where, once employees are free to dress as they please, autonomy and personal expression will 
rule the day.  Yet “this idea of self-autonomy runs counter to the constraints of the 
workplace,”160 and it is difficult to conceive how eliminating dress codes could transform the 
workplace into an environment in which individuals feel free to, and in fact have the ability to, 
express their authentic selves.  
 Although work is an undeniably important aspect of most people’s lives, there is 
nonetheless a distinct separation between our personal lives and work lives.  As noted by 
Michael Selmi, the workplace is “a place of uniforms and conformity, a place where we go to be 
someone else, to perform for someone else . . . to earn a living, to make friends perhaps, but 
more importantly, to earn money that allows [us] to enjoy the other parts of [our] lives.”161  And 
even if we take the word “uniforms” out of the equation, the result will remain largely 
unchanged – as perhaps it should.  The more we rely upon the workplace to act as a forum for 
identity, authenticity, or self-expression, the less emphasis we may place on our lives outside of 
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work.
162
  Ultimately, this will only serve to frustrate our ability to express our authentic selves, 
as the intrinsic nature of the workplace can never allow for the type of true freedom that we 
experience at home.  
 Dress codes and uniforms may be uncomfortable, confining, at odds with an employee’s 
self-image, or just plain ugly.  But in the end, the law’s broad approval of employers’ reasonable, 
nondiscriminatory appearance codes best reflects our society’s dual interests in providing 
businesses freedom from undue government interference and ensuring that the liberty and 
equality rights of citizens are not infringed upon.  To argue for complete protection against 
workplace appearance standards is both an unrealistic and problematic goal which mistakenly 
equates the ability to control one’s public image with the realization of one’s authentic identity.  
We should neither expect nor want the workplace to become the principal forum for the 
expression of our authentic selves, and should instead appreciate that our “homes,” be them 
literal or figurative, foster and allow us to express our true identities in a way that the workplace 
never can.      
V. CONCLUSION 
 Darlene Jespersen’s tale is not one of triumph, nor is it one that inspires much faith in 
humanity.  Why a loyal, hard-working, and successful employee of over twenty years should be 
forced out of a job over such a seemingly trivial issue as makeup is a question that lacks a 
satisfactory answer, and it is difficult to regard Harrah’s actions against Jespersen as anything 
but callous.  Jespersen’s case was indeed one of hard facts, and the Ninth Circuit’s decision 
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could have given credence to the adage that hard facts make bad law.  Ultimately, however, the 
Jepsersen Court stayed true to the law and to its limits in shaping that law, thereby avoiding a 
more benevolent but legally unsound result.  
 In recognizing that Jespersen’s case failed to establish sufficient evidence of unequal 
burdens and did not fit within the legal framework of sex stereotyping as set forth in Price 
Waterhouse and thereafter interpreted by the lower courts, the Ninth Circuit properly applied 
Title VII and its existing body of law to the facts and came to the proper conclusion.  Moreover, 
the court was right to be wary of stretching the law in such a way as to achieve a favorable result 
for Jespersen, sensitive to the slippery slope that such broad protection against employer 
appearance codes would likely create.  Essentially, had the Jespersen decision gone the other 
way, the Ninth Circuit would have carved out a new area of protection for discrimination based 
on appearance.  Such protection is justifiable neither on legal grounds nor by the interests of 
society.   If courts were to declare all employer appearance requirements unenforceable, they 
would place an unreasonable burden on employers, particularly those in service-based industries, 
by demanding that workplaces ignore the importance of appearances in the business world.  
Rather than force an idealistic yet insincere worldview upon employers whose businesses may be 
seriously undermined without the ability to regulate the appearance of employees, courts should 
continue to give deference to employers’ reasonable decisions regarding dress and grooming 
requirements.   
 Therefore, I ultimately submit that who we are at work does not automatically dictate 
who we are at home, nor should we necessarily aspire to blur the work/home dichotomy by 
treating the workplace as a playground for self-expression and identity formation.  For in the 
end, whether makeup-free or caked in cosmetics, Darlene Jespersen had one identity as far as 
35 
 
Harrah’s was concerned: that of a bartender.  A unique hairstyle or outfit could not have changed 
that fact.  Yet once Jespersen walked out of the casino at the end of each shift, she was no longer 
a mere bartender.  Perhaps she was a daughter, a sister, a friend, a baker, a musician, an avid 
reader, or a world traveler; she could have been all of these things and more.  These things, 
whatever they may have been, are what constituted Darlene Jespersen’s true self, and while her 
role as a bartender may not have been able to accommodate this authentic identity during work, 
her true self – the most important of identities – was still waiting for her when she returned home 
each night.  
